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Kobak: Dealing With Conflicts And Disqualification Risks Professionally

DEALING WITH CONFLICTS AND
DISQUALIFICATION RISKS PROFESSIONALLY

*

James B. Kobak, Jr.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A recent article suggests that a perceived increase in tactical
disqualification motions, including those based on conflicts of interest,
may be illusory.' On the other hand, large and small firms have recently
found themselves on the receiving end of such motions in a number of
significant litigations, suggesting that the threat of such motions may be
all too real.2 Though results in the cases vary, the consequences
of such motions are also very real, potentially extending far
beyond the disqualification itself. The consequences potentially
include malpractice actions, sanctions, reimbursement of fees previously
paid or writing off significant fees not yet received, the time and expense
of investigating and litigating the issue, and the loss of client
relationships and reputation.3
* General Counsel, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP. I would like to thank my colleagues
Miles Orton and Lauren Lipari and summer associate Scott Yakaitis for their invaluable research,
comments, and general assistance and Susan Fortney for her helpful comments.
1.

See generally Keith Swisher, The Practice and Theory of Lawyer Disqualification, 27

GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 71 (2014).
2.

See infra Part 11.

3. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 53, SAS Inst., Inc. v. Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, No. 5:10-CV-101 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2015), ECF No. 325 (granting
judgment against law firm for constructive fraud for double amount of actual damages; presently on
appeal); Memorandum Decision Re Fee Application of Debtor's Former Counsel at 10-14, In re
McIntosh, No. 13-11774 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015), ECF No. 132 (rejecting attorney fee
application and requiring attorney to refund fees received in side-switching case); Madison 92nd St.
Assocs., LLC v. Marriott Int'l Inc., No. 13 Civ. 291, 2013 WL 5913382, at *12-15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
31, 2013), aff'd sub nom. Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP v. Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 603 F.
App'x 19 (2d Cir. 2015) (sanctioning law firm over $270,000); Complaint ¶¶40-118, Motion Point
Corp. v. McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Civ. No. 521102 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2013) (suing law
firm for $2 million in previously paid fees and rejecting invoice for $1 million in unpaid fees);
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), 3M Co. v.
Covington & Burling LLP, No. 0:12-CV-01800 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2012), ECF No. 25
(withdrawing malpractice action against Covington & Burling LLP); State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M
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Not all of these consequences are insured, and some can have longterm consequences. In some of these recent cases, the motions seem
largely tactical, while in others the lawyers facing disqualification seem
to have made fundamental missteps, at least from the perfect vision of
uninvolved hindsight.' And in others still, revelation of a conflict during
litigation arising from work done years before may have come as an
unpleasant surprise, triggering a sense of betrayal on one side, and
possible loss of chosen counsel in medias res on the other.s
This Article seeks to explore the nature of certain conflicts that
have arisen in recent cases, the reasons or causes for them, the manner in
which the firms or lawyers involved have attempted to deal with them,
and the tools and analysis courts have applied to deal with the
consequences. The situation is further complicated by the increasing
lateral movement among lawyers at firms and even within law firms, as
well as by the atomization of legal work. The growth and complexity of
intellectual property ("IP") have been particularly fertile sources of
conflicts problems, although they are by no means confined to that field
alone. Also contributing to the conundrum is the rigor of two features of
Co., No. A12-1856, 2013 WL 3284285, at *3, *7 (Minn. Ct. App. July 1, 2013), af'd in part, rev'd
in part, 845 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 2014) (disqualification order remanded); see also Hamilton v.
Sommers, 855 N.W.2d 855, 866-69 (S.D. 2014) (finding of non-consentable conflict part of
malpractice claim surviving summary judgment); In re Rosanna, 395 B.R. 697, 705-07 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 2008) (referring attorney to disciplinary committee because of egregious side-switching
conflict); Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Mfg. Co., No. B256314, 2016 WL
364742, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016) (reimbursement of all fees); 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2008) (discussing legal
malpractice and forfeiture of fees). Although the case seems so unique that I will not discuss it in
detail, I would be remiss not to mention the Magistrate Judge's recommendation in Mylan, Inc. v.
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, in which Kirkland & Ellis LLP ("K&E") was enjoined from representing
Teva in a hostile takeover of Mylan, Inc. because of its present and former representation of Mylan,
Inc. subsidiaries in major IP litigations after these subsidiaries had been merged into a European
holding company that was the direct target of the takeover. See generally Report and
Recommendation on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Mylan, Inc., No. 15-581 (W.D.
Pa. June 9, 2015), ECF No. 96. While K&E withdrew from that engagement, it challenged the
recommended action in the district court, but the dispute became moot when Teva withdrew its bid
in favor of a transaction with another company.
4. See, e.g., Madison 92nd Street Assocs., 2013 WL 5913382, at *3-6; FlatWorld
Interactives LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 12-cv-01956, 2013 WL 4039799, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7,
2013).
5. See, e.g., Western Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., No. CV-1 1-3473, 2015
WL 690306, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2015) (disqualifying law firm in merger for conflict that
arose after 20,000 lawyer hours and $12 million of fees); j2 Global Commc'ns, Inc. v. Captaris,
Inc., No. CV-09-04150, 2012 WL 6618272, at *1-3, *1l (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (disqualifying
counsel for defendant where attorney performed research and review on behalf of plaintiff as a
junior associate at a different law firm seven years earlier); Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Flo TV
Inc., No. 10-812, 2012 WL 4364244, at *5-6 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2012) (disqualifying defendant's
counsel where other attorneys within the firm had represented the plaintiffs parent corporation
twenty years earlier).
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U.S. conflicts rules: first, the concurrent client conflicts rule in all U.S.
jurisdictions but Texas, which is out-of-step with the rules of many other
jurisdictions in not requiring a substantial relationship between matters
as a condition to finding a conflict;6 and second, the imputation rule.
But surely another contributing factor is the attitude of counsel
themselves-not only firms that fail to deal with the issues adequately at
the outset or behave with less than complete attention or candor
when a problem is identified, but also company counsel who adopt
broad guidelines for conflicts that are arguably far more draconian
and confining for counsel than the rules of professional conduct
themselves. While difficult conflicts problems will always
remain-as they should in a profession founded on loyalty to clients
and protection of their confidences-a more professional approach
would reduce their prevalence, as well as the time and resources spent
on satellite litigation about them.
II.

TYPE I AND TYPE 2 CONFLICTS AND SOME OF
THE BASIC RULES

It is useful to divide recent conflicts decisions into two categories.
First, some cases (which, for convenience, I shall call "Type 1" conflicts
cases) betray counsel's inattentiveness or spotty due diligence (or in a
few cases, simply an unfortunate confluence of circumstances),
especially as to matters handled at the same firm long ago, or work done
by laterals in the past at other firms. Sometimes this inattentiveness
carries over to a failure to react appropriately or promptly after
the issue has come to light, either by failing to investigate and
engage in meaningful discussions, or by delaying potentially remedial
steps such as screens. Even when the blunder is not egregious,
the problem is exacerbated by the application of strict imputation
rules, including doctrines of infectious imputation beyond a single firm.
One can quibble about details and results, but underlying most of these
Type 1 cases is a serious concern about access to information, or even
"side-switching," with respect to relevant work done for a former client
who is now an adversary.
Second, the somewhat doctrinaire (and what some would say is
outmoded) operation of the concurrent client conflicts and imputation
rules creates what I shall call "Type 2" conflicts issues. These cases
arise, and take up the time of courts and litigants, even when no

6. See infra Part II.A.1.
7. See infra Part II.A.5.
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substantial relationship exists between matters and no fundamental client
interest seems to be threatened.
The following discussion of applicable rules and principles
provides a foundation for understanding and analyzing cases in
each category.
A.

Basics of the Relevant Conflicts Rules

1. Concurrent Clients
The concurrent client conflicts rule in every state but Texas, based
largely on the duty of loyalty, prevents a lawyer from acting adversely to
a current client on any matter, even with respect to matters wholly
unrelated to any work the lawyer is doing for the client, and even when
the representation involves no possible use of a client's confidences.'
Because the prevailing American rule is predicated on a duty of loyalty,
it does not require a substantial relationship between matters, or a risk of
misuse of confidential information, as is the case in many other parts of
the world.9
2. Former Clients
With respect to former clients, the prevailing rule recognizes a
conflict only if a substantial relationship exists between matters or the
lawyer had access to confidential information of the client in the former
representation that is material to the second representation (where it
might be used against the former client or place the lawyer in a position
of divided loyalty between the two clients)."o The former client conflicts
rule is based primarily on the duty of confidentiality and only
secondarily on the duty of loyalty."
8.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). The Model Rules of

Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") use a "direct adversity" standard, also favored by the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement"), but New York, for example,

uses a potentially more expansive "differing interests" standard. See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
§ 121; NEW YORK RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (N.Y.

THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
STATE BAR ASS'N 2014).

9. For example, Solicitors in England and Wales cannot act, with limited exceptions, for two
or more current clients where there is a conflict or significant risk of a conflict where "conflict of
interest" is defined to mean any situation where "you owe separate duties to act in the best interest
of two or more clients in relation to the same or related matters, and those duties conflict, or there

is a significant risk that those duties may conflict." See Solicitors Regulation Auth. Code of Conduct
2011, c. 3 (Eng. & Wales) (emphasis added).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 19; see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1
Ethics, Op. 1008 (2014).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 19 cmt. 1. As the courts occasionally note, duty of
loyalty does play some role in the treatment of former client relationships as, for example, when a
lawyer or firm switches sides in the same case or is in a position of negating or limiting the effect of
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3. Prospective Clients
A somewhat similar, but more flexible, rule applies to prospective
clients who do not become clients. A conflict arises if a prospective
client disclosed "significantly harmful" confidential information to the
attorney with some reasonable expectation that an attorney-client
relationship may be formed.' 2 This rule, too, is premised on the duty of
confidentiality and provides that the conflict may be cured by prompt
and effective screening of lawyers who received confidential
information with notice to the prospective client.1 3 The recognition of
screening in the prospective client rule is particularly significant in a
state such as New York, which has not adopted a rule to permit
screening to cure intra-firm imputation of former client conflicts in other
contexts, such as that of lateral hires.14
4. Possible Positional Conflicts
A final type of conflict, addressed at best inferentially in the rules,
is a positional conflict." Such a possible conflict involves taking a
formal position in a matter not involving the client that may nevertheless
be contrary to a position important to the client in other matters,
including some where the lawyer may work with the client."6 Apart from
the business retention problems they are likely to cause, historically,
these situations generally have not been thought to pose true conflicts
where different positions are taken before different courts," though in

the lawyer's or law firm's own prior work for a client that is now adverse. See SLC, Ltd. v.
Bradford Grp. W., 999 F.2d 464, 468 (10th Cir. 1993) ("An individual attorney's continuing duty of
loyalty to his client may prevent him from taking an adverse position, but this would not extend to
his new firm as a whole."). Comment (b) to section 121 of the Restatement observes that the
conflicts rules serve some additional purposes such as assuring effective presentation of issues to
tribunals. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. b.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.18; see Cascades Branding Innovation, LLC v.
Walgreen Co., No. 11 C02519, 2012 WL 1570774, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2012) (disqualifying a
firm based on an attorney's receipt of information from a potential client that could be significantly
harmful); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 1067 (2015).
13.
14.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.18(d).
NEW YORK RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.10(c) (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N 2014).

15. As noted in a comment, the Model Rules regard this as a conflict only when arguing two
sides of a similar issue in different matters will create a significant and material limitation on the
lawyer's advocacy for one of the clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 24. The
New York State Bar Association's version of this comment has a more extensive listing of factors
that may reveal a conflict. NEW YORK RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 24.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 468 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (D. Conn. 2007)
(describing positional conflicts); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128
cmt. f (Am. LAW INST. 2000) (discussing the act of taking two matters with concurrent legal
interests to client).
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some circumstances discernible and concrete harm to a client may
mandate disqualification."s
5. Imputation of Conflicts
The strict imputation rule in the United States exacerbates the effect
of the conflicts rules.' 9 This rule stipulates that aside from certain
personal conflicts that are not the concern of this Article, the conflict of
any lawyer in a firm, including a lateral hire, is imputed to every lawyer
at a firm.2 0 Under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules"), for which the pertinent rule was adopted in 2009 after
considerable debate by its House of Delegates, effective screening under
carefully prescribed conditions may be used to cure some lateral
conflicts. 2' Many states, such as New York, however, have not adopted
this rule; in those states, except in the presence of consent, screening is
not an option, though courts, in an exercise of their discretion to control
the conduct of lawyers in the proceedings before them, do sometimes
permit its use to avoid disqualifying a firm for conflicts of lawyers with
peripheral roles in the matter.22
6. Subsidiary Issues
In part because of their strictness, these conflicts rules raise many
subsidiary issues. For example, the question of whether representation of
an entity amounts to representation of another part of the entity or the
entire entity may be determinative of a disqualification motion.2 3
Similarly, because of the difference between the test for concurrent
client conflicts compared to that for former client conflicts, much may
depend on whether a client relationship has or has not been terminatedan intensely fact-based legal conclusion.24

18.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 24.

19. Id. r. 1.10.
20. Id. r. 1.10(a)(2).
21. Id. r. 1.1 0(a)(2)(i).
22. See Intelli-Check, Inc. v. Tricom Techns., Inc., No. 03 CV 3706, 2008 WL 4682433, at
*4-6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008). Screening is also endorsed by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124(b) cmt. d.
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 34; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE

LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. d. The New York comments discuss a number of factors
beyond those outlined in the ABA comment, dealing with them in three separate paragraphs (34,
34A and 34B) in a very "on the one hand, on the other" fashion. See NEW YORK RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 34A-34D (N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 2014). See generally Kristen Salvatore
DePalma & Emily V. Borden, Engagingwith the Realities of the CorporateFamily, 12 DEL. L.
REV. 133 (2011).
24. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 1008 (2014); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss2/15
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7. Consent
All these conflicts can be cured by waiver if the lawyer reasonably
determines that she can adequately represent all parties involved and all
parties give informed consent.15 Sometimes the consent can take the
form of a limitation on the scope of representation to avoid the conflict. 6
Waivers, however, are not always panaceas. Even when clients agree to
some form of consent-and they do not always agree-questions often
arise over whether a waiver, particularly one given in advance, is made
with knowledge of all relevant information, as well as to what matters
and to what entities it extends. It may be difficult, if not impossible, to
identify and discuss all possible future ramifications of the potentially
conflicting representations. Additionally, informed consent requires
disclosure of meaningful information.2 7 The interests of one client in
keeping a matter or proposed course of conduct absolutely confidential
may sometimes preclude the lawyer even from broaching the subject
with the other client, thereby preventing the possibility of providing the
information necessary for informed consent.28

25.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4).

26. Id. r. 1.2(c). An example might include informing the client that a law firm might not be
able to bring or defend certain claims for a debtor or trustee in bankruptcy, or might not be able to
pursue certain contingent cross claims or contested discovery against certain parties, requiring
engagement of separate conflicts counsel. The courts, however, sometimes reject consent when
cross-claims seem inevitable. See Zambrotta v. 2935 Equities LLC, No. 18686/03, 2013 WL
676450, at *2-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 26, 2013) (raising sua sponte disqualification of firm because of
possibility of indemnification claims even when parties consented).
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.0(e) (defining "informed consent" as an
"agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks and reasonably available alternatives
to the proposed course of conduct").
28.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

121 cmt b. Unless

implicated in cases otherwise discussed, this Article will not deal with personal interest conflicts,
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1 .17(a)(2), 1.8, or lawyer-as-witness issues, MODEL RULE OF

PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.7. This Article will also not tackle the many issues implicated in joint
representations. See, e.g., GEM Holdco, LLC v. Changing World Techs., L.P., No. 650841/2013
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9,2015), afd in part, 14 N.Y.S.3d 14 (App. Div. 2015); N.Y. State Bar Comm.
on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 903 (2012). This Article will also not tackle issues from representing codefendants or co-plaintiffs, or in representing a close corporation and its constituents, an area where
the sloppy or non-existent treatment of possible conflicts in engagement letters has led to some
unfavorable decisions, including in the New York state courts. See, e.g., Decision and Order at 2-4,
Barmash v. Perlman, No. 650417/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 3, 2013); Morris v. Morris, 763
N.Y.S.2d 622, 624-25 (App. Div. 2003); In re Greenberg, 614 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (App. Div. 1994).
This Article will also not discuss conflicts arising from lateral movement of government lawyers,
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.11, which involve both state ethics rules and rules or
policies of governmental entities. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GovERNING LAWYERS

§ 131 cmt. b. This Article also does not discuss conflicts in criminal representations with their
overlay of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel concerns.
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RECENT TYPE I CONFLICTS CASES-HOT POTATOES,
SIDE-SWITCHERS, AND ISSUES THAT FALL
THROUGH THE CRACKS

Now let us explore how these basic rules have been applied to some
of the more significant and interesting recent cases. I will start with what
I consider Type I cases in my taxonomy-those with at least potentially
serious consequences.
A.

A Sampling ofRecent Cases

One such cautionary tale unfolded in Madison 92nd Street
Associates, LLC v. Marriott International, Inc.2 9 In 2013, the wellknown firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP ("BSF"), representing a
once bankrupt limited liability corporation that owned several Courtyard
Marriott hotels, commenced an action against both Marriott and Host, a
hotel chain that had settled a dispute with Marriott more than a decade
before."o The complaint alleged that in their settlement in 2002, the two
companies had conspired to ensure that certain hotels owned and
operated by Marriott would not be union hotels while other franchised
hotels, such as those operated by the plaintiff, would be."
During discussions among the parties to the 2013 lawsuit, Host
pointed out that BSF had represented Host on the very settlement it was
now challenging as a conspiracy on behalf of its new client.32 After
denying the existence of a conflict for several months, during which time
BSF conducted what the court characterized as a lax internal
investigation, BSF proceeded to file a complaint against Host, and
dribbled out material relevant to the prior representation in a manner that
the district court characterized as slow and deliberate.3 3 Only after being
provided with a draft motion to disqualify did BSF admit (or, in the
court's view, focus on the fact) that it was conflicted and agree to take
steps to withdraw from the representation.3 4 Host brought a motion for
sanctions, seeking to recover the amount of attorneys' fees it incurred in
persuading BSF to withdraw.

29.
Schiller
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

No. 13 Civ. 291, 2013 WL 5913382 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013), affd sub nom. Boies,
& Flexner LLP v. Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 603 F. App'x 19 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5-10.
Id.at*10-ll.
Id. at * 1.
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The district court granted Host's motion for sanctions, stating that
"[a] clearer conflict of interest cannot be imagined. A first year law
student on day one of an ethics course should be able to spot it. BSF,
which holds itself out as one of the country's preeminent law firms, did
not." 6 The opinion continued with equally harsh language, titling one
section of the opinion, "Oh, THAT Conflict!" and noting that BSF's
conduct was "infinitely more egregious" than conduct that raised
conflicts concerns in other cases." BSF, according to the court, rejected
Host's complaint about the conflict before it had even reviewed its files,
later failed to properly review files, and dragged its feet in producing the
majority of them." The court awarded Host its reasonable attorney
fees-over a quarter of a million dollars-from the date when BSF was
informed for the third time about the conflict and refused to stop work

on the matter.
The sanctions order was appealed and vigorously argued
in the Second Circuit.40 The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment, stating that "without endorsing all of the tonalities of
the district court's opinion-we affirm for substantially the reasons
stated therein."'

The case, as reported, has two lessons for many of us: first, in
performing conflicts checks, it may often be necessary to go beyond
paper records and engage knowledgeable attorneys in a discussion of
what may have been involved below the summary description of a
representation in a client intake memorandum; and second, when
possible conflicts are brought to one's attention, they ought to be
investigated seriously and acted on diligently at the outset.
State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M Co., is another case involving a wellregarded firm-Covington & Burling-work done a decade before, and
the added color of the so-called "hot potato" doctrine.4 2 In 1992, 3M Co.
("3M") engaged the firm to assist in its efforts to obtain approval from
the FDA to use perfluorochemicals ("PFCs"), which it manufactured

36. Id. at*1.
37. Id. at *10, *13.
38. Id at *13.
39. Host was represented by the well-respected firm Proskauer Rose LLP, but the court felt
the conflicts issue so self-evident that it essentially wrote off a large percentage of the time of two
partners, concluding that an associate and counsel could have handled more of the work with
modest partner input and review. Order Awarding Sanctions at 1, Madison 92nd Street Assocs.,
LLC v. Courtyard Mgmt. Corp., No. 13-cv-00291 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2014), ECF No. 133.
40. Boies, Schiller & Flexner v. Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 603 F. App'x. 19 (2d Cir. 2015).
41. Id. at 20.
42. No. Al2-1856, 2013 WL 3284285 (Minn. Ct. App. July 12, 2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 845 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 2014).
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between 1995 and 2000 in food packaging. 43 The firm's representation
on matters relating to the FDA approval lasted until 2000; the firm also
represented 3M on a number of different, unrelated matters until
December 2010, when it sent a letter terminating the relationship." Less
than three weeks later, the firm was appointed "Special Attorney" to the
State of Minnesota and filed suit against 3M related to the release of
PFCs into the state's ground and surface waters.45 The firm believed that
the prior FDA regulatory matters were not substantially related to the
ground water contamination litigation, and did not involve a likelihood
of the misuse of confidential information,4 6 since the engagements had
different focuses, over a decade had passed since the conclusion of the
firm's PFC work for 3M, and 3M, following a consent order
with the state in 2007, had already made public disclosures about the
hazards and health and environmental effects of its PFCs (although some
documents subject to attomey-client privilege were excluded from the
public disclosures). 7
About fifteen months later, the lawyers representing 3M in the
groundwater litigation discovered the firm's name in documents
produced by 3M. 4 8 3M first demanded that its former firm disclose all
files on which the firm represented 3M, and subsequently requested that
the firm withdraw from its representation of the State, which the firm
refused to do. 49 3M maintained that it was unaware of the firm's work on
its PFCs matter until March 2012, although the court noted that evidence
in the record contradicted this position. 0
The court found that, although the firm's former representation of
3M in the FDA matters had a different focus from its representation of
the State in the new matter, both matters concerned the risks PFCs pose
to human health, and were therefore substantially related for purposes of
Minnesota's version of Rule 1.9." The record indicated that 3M was, or
should have been, aware of the conflict long before it raised the issue of
disqualification.52 But that delay did not, in the trial court's view,
override the lawyer's duty to fully inform and obtain consent from the

43.

Id at * 1.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4-6.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id
Id at *4.
Id. at *6.
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client. Moreover, the firm had access to some still confidential and
potentially relevant 3M documents and information-the documents
previously excepted from public disclosure as privileged-which the
court emphasized was the very type of information Rule 1.9 was
designed to protect.5 4
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, after deciding that the firm had
standing independent of its client to appeal the disqualification order,
took a more nuanced approach to the issues." It determined that the
district court failed to "meaningfully assess" the firm's claims that the
information was no longer confidential, remanding this issue to the
district court.5 ' The Supreme Court also held that the right to seek
disqualification under Rule 1.9(a) could have been waived, but
determined that the record of the district's court's analysis of whether
waiver took place was incomplete and remanded on this issue as well."
On the other hand, the Court determined that Rule 1.9(a) would mandate
disqualification if its requirements were found to be met and would not
permit any weighing of equities." On remand, after discovery and a sixday evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that a conflict existed but
had been waived."
The firm in Swanson did send a termination letter, but its timing
was regarded as suspect, coming within weeks of the start of the new
relationship and giving the appearance of dropping a client like the
proverbial "hot potato" in favor of a major engagement. 60 The firm's
ethics screen was also held to be of no avail without the former client's
consent because of the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the
strictness of the rule and its presumption that significant confidential
information would be shared. 6 ' Although it may not have affected the
outcome, the firm's apparent delay in sending a termination letter until
the eve of litigation undoubtedly did not make for a friendly
ex-client. To prove how unfriendly it was, 3M filed a damages action
against the firm.62
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M Co., 845 N.W.2d 808, 814-21 (Minn. 2014).
56. Id. at 817.
57. Id. at 817-20.
58. Id. at 820-21.
59. State of Minn. v. 3M Company, No. 27-CV-10-28862 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 5, 2016).
60. 3M Co., 845 N.W.2d at 812; see also Western Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels Midland
Co., No. CV 11-3473, 2015 WL 690306, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2015) (discussing termination
letter sent by counsel after client requested disqualification).
61. 3MCo.,845N.W.2dat817.
62. Complaint, 3M Co. v. Covington & Burling LLP, No. 12-CV-01800 (D. Minn. July 24,
2012), ECF No. 1.
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The absence of any termination letter at all played a feature role in
ParallelIron, LLC v. Adobe Systems Inc." There, Adobe Systems Inc.
("Adobe") first engaged a partner at a boutique IP firm in April 2006 to
provide an opinion letter on whether one of Adobe's products infringed
a patent held by another company. 64 The partner was again engaged to
provide opinions in May 2009 and August 2010.65 The firm never acted
as litigation or trial counsel. Five months after the submission of the
partner's last opinion letter to Adobe, Parallel Iron, LLC ("PI") retained
the firm to file suit against Adobe on unrelated patents.6 6 Adobe asserted
that the firm was still serving as opinion counsel for it at the time of suit
and moved for its disqualification.6 7
The court analyzed the situation as a concurrent client conflict of
interest, finding it reasonable for Adobe to believe that the firm was still
acting on its behalf.68 This was a client-centric analysis. The firm had
never refused work from Adobe over its six-year relationship and had
never formally terminated the attorney-client relationship." Although
the role of opinion counsel involves a somewhat limited scope of work,
opinion counsel is still counsel with all the duties and professional
obligations of counsel under the professional responsibility rules.70 The
court gave short shrift to an argument that Adobe must have intended the
relationship to terminate when, upon delivering the third opinion letter,
the attorney asked whether anything else was required and received no
affirmative reply, an incident the court dismissed as a customary
gesture." The court did not, however, go the giant step further of
imputing the conflict to the firn's co-counsel in the litigation, finding no
bad faith or involvement by the client in the boutique's conflict.7 2

A less happy outcome, at least for the firm litigating the case-in
this case, Latham & Watkins LLP ("Latham")-occurred in Eon Corp.
IP Holdings LLC v. Flo TV Inc." From 1988 to 1995, Latham had
represented an entity known as TV Answer, which subsequently became
Eon.74 The companies were based in Virginia, and the two lawyers from

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

No. 12-874, 2013 WL 789207 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2013).
Id at *1.
Id
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *2.
Id
Id. at *4.
No. 10-812, 2012 WL 4364244 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2012).
Id. at *1.
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Latham who represented Eon were based in the firm's Washington D.C.
office." These attorneys handled corporate and regulatory matters, but
not patent prosecution or litigation.76
In 2010, Eon initiated a patent infringement lawsuit against
seventeen defendants, including MobiTV, which engaged two Latham
attorneys from the firm's Los Angeles office to represent it in the
action.77 Neither of the two Latham attorneys engaged for the litigation
had worked for Latham during its previous representation of Eon.
Nevertheless, Eon moved to disqualify the firm.
The court found that Latham's prior representation had been broad
in scope, and included familiarity with aspects of Eon's technologies
that were at least partially related to the patent at issue in the litigation,
even though Latham had not aided Eon in obtaining the patent.79 A
central prong of Eon's defense was patent invalidity, an issue that could
have involved a factual inquiry into many of Eon's activities during the
time period in which the two lawyers in Washington represented Eon.so
In fact, one of MobiTV's co-defendants identified two former Latham
lawyers as potential witnesses.
Because information about related
factual matters could have been shared with Latham attorneys, and any
such information might have been detrimental to Eon in the litigation,
the court concluded that a conflict existed under Rule 1.9, and that it was
to be imputed to the firm as a whole under Rule 1.10.82
The court then discussed Latham's "ethics wall," which the firm
instituted prior to performing any substantive work on MobiTV's case.83
In an interesting analysis, the court found it conceivable that the two
Latham attorneys would be called to testify in the case to be tried by
attorneys from the same firm's Los Angeles office, ethics wall or no
ethics wall.84 While the court supposed that accommodations could be
made to prevent the jury from learning that the Latham attorneys who
represented Eon worked for one of the defendants' law firm during their
representation, such accommodations are "the sort of thing that would

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id at
Id.
Id. at

*4.
*4-5.
*4.
*5.
*4-5.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 15

510

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:497

&

give rise to the perception by the general public that the rules are
designed to avoid.""
A British decision, Georgian American Alloys, Inc. v. White
Case LLP, illustrates how problematic detecting and finding a solution
for a serious conflict can be even for a firm as renowned for its ethics
standards and expertise, as White & Case LLP." In September 2010, a
partner working out of the firm's London and Moscow offices began
advising a man named Mr. Pinchuk and his management company,
Eastone Group ("Eastone"), in relation to a dispute between Mr. Pinchuk
and two men, Mr. Kolomoisky and Mr. Bogolyubov, with respect to a
joint venture between them. Mr. Pinchuk claimed that he did not receive
his share of the profits from the venture." On April 20, 2011, the general
counsel of Optima Acquisitions LLC and Optima Industrial
Management LLC (collectively, "Optima") contacted a partner working
out of the law firm's New York office, inquiring whether the firm would
represent the Optima entities in implementing a corporate restructuring
involving a number of corporate entities, including the creation
of a new holding company to be known as Georgian American Alloys,
Inc. ("GAA")." The general counsel of Optima identified "Mr.
Kolomoisky and Mr. Bogolyubov as two of the ultimate owners of the
businesses involved."89
The New York partner carried out a conflicts search and learned of
the Eastone engagement.90 He told the partner on the Eastone
engagement about the proposed Optima engagement and asked about the
nature and status of the Eastone matter. The partner on the Eastone
engagement replied that the Eastone dispute had been settled and that he
had not heard from Eastone for a number of months, and therefore
assumed that the dispute had gone away since Mr. Kolomoisky had paid
Mr. Pinchuk $150 million.9 1 The law firm then took on the Optima
engagement with an engagement letter containing fairly standard
advance waiver language.92

85. Id. at *5. It is interesting to note that, as a pure lawyer-as-a-witness ethics issue, the
possibility that two other Latham lawyers might be called at trial would not in itself necessarily
have precluded Latham from serving as trial counsel as long as the potential witnesses' testimony
would not be materially adverse to the firm's present client or involve disclosure of its confidences.
86. [2014] EWHC (Comm) 94 (Eng.). The description of facts is based entirely on the court's
written opinion.
87. Id at [8].
88. Id at [10].
89. Id
90. Id. at [11].
91. Id. at [11]-[13].
92. Id. at [15]-[16].
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The plot thickened in May 2012, when the Eastone partner received
instructions to evaluate potential additional claims against Mr.
Kolomoisky and Mr. Bogolyubov. 93 The Eastone partner waited until
research determined the existence of a potential claim to run a check.94
After conducting the internal check, the firm determined that there was
no actual conflict of interest, presumably because it did not represent the
two targets of the claim individually. However, at the beginning of
March 2013, as the Eastone team was preparing to launch proceedings,
further internal discussions took place. The firm decided to establish an
"ethical screen" between the firm's representation of Optima and its
representation of Eastone and Mr. Pinchuk." The screen implemented
was extensive, and utilized state of the art screening software."
Apparently feeling that the screen was not required, but an added
precaution, the firm did not notify any of the relevant parties.97
The firm then filed a claim on behalf of Mr. Pinchuk in
Commercial Court in England against Bogolyubov and Kolomoisky (but
not GAA or other Optima entities represented by the partner in New
York).98 On August 2, 2013, it served a Request for Arbitration on Mr.
Bogolyubov and Mr. Kolomoisky, followed by an application in U.S.
District Court in Florida under 25 U.S.C. § 1782 to obtain documents
and information relating to the arbitration." The information sought
consisted of a large amount of corporate information, including board
minutes, organizational charts, financial statements, sales and purchase
ledgers, valuations, and trading and distribution records of the Optima
companies represented by the New York partners with which
Bogolyubov and Kolomoisky were involved."'o Upon learning of the
firm's involvement in this request and its representation of
Mr. Pinchuk, the Optima general counsel wrote to several partners
at the firm, expressing his concern about the protection of GAA's
confidential information, asking for a detailed account of the
nature of any information barriers erected, and demanding that the firm
cease its representation of Eastone and Mr. Pinchuk.o' When the firm
declined, Optima and related entities in England brought a proceeding to

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at [25].
at [26].
at [27].
at [28]-[32].
at [33].
at [35].
at [41], [43].
at [45].
at [48]-[49].
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enjoin the firm from acting for Eastone and Mr. Pinchuk in the
Commercial Court.10 2
Justice Field of the Queen's Bench Division Commercial Court
determined that the firm had obtained confidential information relating
to Mr. Kolomoisky and Mr. Bogolyubov during its representation of the
Optima entities."' The court found that the relationship between Mr.
Kolomoisky and Mr. Bogolyubov and the entities they owned was such
that a matter adverse to the individuals was also adverse to the
entities." Additionally, the court found a risk that confidential
information had been disclosed to the Eastone team due to delay in
implementing the ethical screen, as well as the geographic overlap of the
Pinchuk, Eastone, and Optima Teams in the New York office for a
period of time.' In addition to the state of the art screen, the firm had
conducted an extensive investigation to demonstrate the absence of any
leakage or misuse of confidential information. Despite this considerable
effort, the court determined that the firm failed to discharge its burden,
which the court regarded as considerable, and of showing no possibility
whatsoever that confidential information may have been disclosed.' 06
Accordingly, the court granted the injunction.' 07 The court virtually
ignored the advance waiver language in the engagement letter.'
The law firm involved could scarcely be accused of approaching
the opposing relationships cavalierly once they became evident. At least
until corporate information was sought in discovery, the conflict, if there
was one, was at best indirect since the firm's actual New York clients
were GAA and other corporate entities, not the individual investors.
Additionally, once the possibility of adverse actions that might implicate
the New York interest was presented, the firm implemented an
extensive screen. The proof offered by the firm that no leakage of
confidential information had occurred was extensive and compelling,

102. Id. at [51], [53].
103. Id. at [79].
104. Id. at [80]-[81].
105. Id. at [85]-[86].
106. Id. at [87].
107. Id. at [97].
108. The applicable language in the engagement letter read as follows:
[Als a condition to our undertaking this representation, it is agreed that we may continue
to represent or undertake to represent existing or new clients even if those clients'
interests are directly adverse to or different from yours or your affiliates, related entities
or persons, including litigation or arbitration and any other related matter regardless of its
magnitude or other importance. No attorney or staff member working on this engagement

shall be involved in such an adverse representation.
Id. at [16].
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though the British court put the firm in the position of essentially having
to prove a negative.
A fatal flaw, at least as far as the court was concerned, was the
failure to inform the clients and seek consent to the screening
measures. 10 9 But it is not clear that the firm would have been permitted
by Mr. Pinchuk to reveal the actions he was preparing to take. Another
possible error was the assumption-undiscussed and unconfirmed by the
client-that the Pinchuk-Eastone engagement had ended at the time the
New York engagement began. 1 o But probably, the lesson of this and
many other cases is the strength of the presumption-irrebuttable in a
few jurisdictions, and virtually irrebuttable in others-that once an
attorney has had access to material confidential information, it will be
deemed to have found its way to every other lawyer with whom that
lawyer is associated.
B.

The ProblemsLateralsMay Bring

A number of these recent Type 1 cases demonstrate the conflicts
issues that lateral hires can raise. As noted above, absent at least prompt
screening in some states, but with consent of all affected clients in most
others, conflicts from a matter on which a laterally-hired attorney
worked at a prior firm are imputed to all the lawyers at the new firm. A
case on point is j2 Global Communications Inc. v. Captaris Inc.' A
junior associate at Kenyon and Kenyon LLP ("Kenyon") began working
on j2 Global Communications Inc. ("j2") matters as a part of a team of
attorneys in 2004.112 The record showed that while at Kenyon, during
2004 and 2005, the attorney conducted a significant amount of work for
j2, including analysis of whether defendants whom j2 might sue for
patent infringement had valid defenses. 3 Thereafter, the attorney left
Kenyon and became an associate at Crowell Moring ("CM"). 114

Then, in 2008 and 2011, j2 filed patent-related lawsuits against
Open Text and two of its subsidiaries."' Open Text hired an attorney to
109. Id. at [33].
110. Id. at [13]-[15]. For a somewhat similar outcome involving a more direct former client
conflict, albeit one arising from limited pre-litigation work for one of the clients, see Response of
K&L Gates LLP to Motion to Disqualify, Cyber-Switching Patents, LLC v. Easton Corp., No. 14cv-02682 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2014), ECF No. 30. The firm there withdrew but noted that in its
view the matters were not substantially related, an effective screen had been established, and no
confidential information had been disclosed. Id.
111. No. CV-09-04150, 2012 WL 6618272 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012).
112. Id. at *1.
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id at *3.
115. Id.
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serve as lead defense counsel in 2008, and subsequently in 2012, that
attorney joined the firm Perkins Coie ("Perkins").I 6 Meanwhile, Open
Text asked another of its law firms, CM, to assign one of its attorneys to
serve as Open Text's outside in-house counsel for IP matters.' 17 CM
selected the attorney who had transferred from Kenyon to fill the role,
but did not seek a conflicts waiver from j2.1" The attorneys at Perkins
were unaware that the attorney had previously worked with j2."9
The CM attorney worked with Perkins on a number of occasions,
including in assisting Perkins in collecting documents to use in
responding to j2's discovery requests. 2 0 During a deposition, the
attorney introduced himself as Open Text's outside in-house counsel.121
Following the deposition, j2's attorneys informed Open Text and
Perkins that the attorney had previously represented j2 and filed a
motion to disqualify Perkins as trial counsel on the ground that it may
have been infected by its exposure to the CM attorney with confidential
j2 information.1 22
The record showed that, while working on j2 matters at Kenyon,
the attorney had been party to a number of emails that discussed some of
the same patents at issue in the Open Text litigation and also discussed
some litigation issues that were relevant to the Open Text litigation.1 2 3
Even if this amounted to only de minimis involvement, the court
concluded, it still sufficed to establish that the attorney acquired some
relevant, potentially confidential information about j2.1 24 The court then
employed the presumption that when a lawyer has confidential
information, that information is available to all lawyers associated with
the lawyer on the matter, whether or not in the same law firm.1 25
The court noted that perhaps an effective screen might have saved
Perkins from disqualification, but the screen came too late.1 26 The
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id at *4.
Id
Id. at *5.
Id at *7.

125.

See id at *7-9; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 123,

cmt. c(iii) (AM. LAW INST. 2000); accord All Am. Semiconductor, Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor,
Inc., No. 07-1200, 2008 WL 5484552, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2008) (holding prior
representation of an individual by a lateral hire in price-fixing investigation disqualified firm from
suing employer on behalf of that party in an antitrust case arising from the same investigation
because the ethical wall was of no benefit to the firm in California, which, like New York, is a nonscreening state).
126. j2 Commc'ns Inc., 2012 WL 6618272 at *9-10.
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attorney had already worked extensively with Perkins on the relevant
matters before Perkins even became aware of his prior work, two firms
removed from it, and instituted the screen. Finding the screen too late to
be fool-proof, the court disqualified Perkins.12 7 This case is thus a stark
reminder (somewhat like the Georgian American Alloy case discussed
above)1 28 of the strictness of the imputation rules when some access to
confidential information occurred-even when, as in this case, the
access was that of a relatively junior attorney at a different firm many
years before.
A clearer example of supposed "side-switching" is In re City of San
Bernardino.12 9 There, attorneys in the Charlotte office of K&L Gates,
LLP ("K&L") represented the California Public Employees' Retirement
System ("CalPERS") on matters relating to the bankruptcy of two
California cities, Stockton and San Bernardino.'s Five lawyers from this
office were recruited to join Winston & Strawn, LLP ("W&S"), a firm
that represented CalPERS's litigation adversary, National Public Finance
Guarantee Corp. 13
W&S constructed an ethical wall around these lateral hires, but
CalPERS contended that ethical walls cannot save a firm from
disqualification when defecting lawyers have switched allegiances to the
firm representing the adversary in the same case. 13 2 This is because sideswitching implicates not only a duty of confidentiality, but also a duty of
loyalty to the former client, and because California, like New York, has
not adopted the Model Rule permitting screening."' In the words of a
California Court of Appeals, which was quoted in CalPERS's motion to
disqualify in San Bernardino, if a "tainted attorney was actually
involved in the representation of the first client, and switches sides in the
same case, no amount of screening will be sufficient, and the

127. Id.
128. See supra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
129. Order Granting Motion of Party in Interest CalPERS to Disqualify Winston & Strawn
LLP, In re City of San Bernardino, No. 6: 12-bk-28006 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013), ECF
No. 662.
130. See Motion of Party in Interest CalPERS to Disqualify Winston & Strawn LLP at 1, In re
City of San Bernardino, No. 6:12-bk-28006 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 17, 2013), ECF No. 594.
131. Id. at 1-2.
132. Id. at 13-17.
133. Id.; see Renee Choy Ohlendorf, CaliforniaMay Get New Rules of Professional Conduct,
LITIG. NEWS: ABA (Sept. 21, 2011), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top
stories/092111-califomia-ethics-model-rules-of-professional-conduct.html (discussing California's
position on the rules on imputation of conflicts).
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presumption of imputed knowledge is conclusive."l34 Ultimately, the
court issued an order, without opinion, granting the motion to disqualify.
In these days of shifting relationships, lateral issues can be further
complicated by changes in client ownership and affiliations, which add
further pitfalls for conflicts searches, but also bring into play
ameliorating doctrines such as the "thrust upon" doctrine,' even if not
expressed in those terms. Consider Synopsys Inc. v. ATopTech Inc.'36
Synopsys Inc. ("Synopsys"), a plaintiff in a patent infringement suit,
moved to disqualify an attorney characterized as a "core member" of the
defendant's trial team.' The attorney, while at another firm more than a
decade earlier, had assisted in prosecuting patent applications for
approximately ten months on behalf of a corporate entity that
subsequently merged with a second company, which was in turn later
acquired by Synopsys.13 8 These changes in corporate ownership gave
Synopsys ownership of four patents challenged in the infringement suit,
on one of which the attorney appeared to have worked at his prior
firm."' Although some potential existed that the attorney or his present
firm would in a sense challenge his own work, his present firm argued
that the prior client had not been Synopsys and that the attorney did not
retain or share any confidential information.' 40 The court did not resolve
these points because the parties sensibly stipulated to allow the law firm
to continue the defense, but without involvement of the attorney in
question, who was ethically screened.' 4
134. Motion of Party in Interest CalPERS to Disqualify Winston & Strawn LLP, supra note
130, at 14 (quoting Kirk v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 649 (Ct. App. 2010)).
135. See infra Part VII.D.
136. Case. No. 3:13-cv-02965 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
137. Synopsys, Inc.'s Notice of Motion and Motion to Disqualify Dickstein Shapiro LLC at 56, 6 n.2, Synopsys, Inc. v. ATopTech, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-02965 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014), ECF
No. 128.
138. See Declaration of Jeffrey A. Miller at 2-4, Synopsis, Inc. v. ATopTech, Inc., No. 3:13cv-02965 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2014), ECF No. 145-6; Declaration of Deborah E. Fishman in Support
of Opposition to Synopsys, Inc.'s Motion to Disqualify Dickstein Shapiro LLP at 2, Synopsis, Inc.
v. ATopTech, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-02965 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2014), ECF No. 145-7 [hereinafter
Fishman Declaration].
139. Fishman Declaration, supra note 138, at 2.
140. See ATopTech, Inc.'s Opposition to Synopsys, Inc.'s Motion to Disqualify Dickstein
Shapiro, LLP at 2-5, Synopsys, Inc. v. ATopTech, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-02965 (N.D. Cal. July 25,
2014), ECF No. 145.
141. See Stipulation Walling Off Mr. Jeffrey Miller and Withdrawing Synopsys's Motion to
Disqualify Dickstein Shapiro LLP, Synopsys Inc. v. A Top Tech. Inc., Case No. 3:13-cv-02965,
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014), ECF No. 162 [hereinafter Stipulation Walling off Mr. Jeffrey Miller].
The opposite of the "thrust upon" conflict is the conflict caused by a law firm merger such as the
Squire Sanders/Patton Boggs merger that led to the firm's disqualification. See Western Sugar
Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2015). There the firm
representing plaintiffs in a false advertising case merged with a firm that represented or had
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Factors That Limit Identification of Type I Conflicts

The situations that give rise to these Type 1 conflicts raise several
problems for lawyers and clients, even when they are endeavoring to do
the right thing. Identifying some of these conflicts seems easy on paper,
but is difficult in practice. Memories of tasks a lawyer did many years
ago, sometimes at a different firm early in the lawyer's career, may be
dim at best, and the conflicts checking records that might be consulted
even if the work was performed at the same firm may well be
lacking in detail about the scope of work performed. Indeed, it is not
uncommon that the work may evolve in ways not apparent at the
opening of an engagement. Moreover, in some lateral situations, detail
may not be achievable at all because of the duties of confidentiality
lawyers owe their present and former clients during lateral discussions,
and even afterwards. 142
The Model Rules and state analogs, historically, did little either to
highlight the confidentiality concerns that attend lateral discussions, or
to provide guidance on how to deal with them. In 2012, the ABA
adopted a new paragraph (7) to the confidentiality rule (Rule 1.6) to
allow some disclosures to detect and resolve conflicts of interest-but
not if disclosures would compromise the attorney-client privilege or
prejudice the client. 143 In this way, the Model Rules did at least highlight
the issue, albeit with minimal guidance.
A committee making recommendations to the New York State Bar
Association ("N.Y. State Bar") recently examined this issue. After
choosing not to adopt the ABA's proposed amendment to Rule 1.6
(which implements a Model Rules definition of confidentiality that
differs from New York's), the Committee proposed a number of
comments to New York's Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.6 and
1.10.'" The proposal, which has now been adopted by the N.Y. State
Bar, recognized that lateral movements take many forms and can have
different impacts on clients. It also generally endorsed disclosure in
stages and the importance of limited access and other precautions, but it

represented two of four defendants in a wide range of matters. The merged firm terminated one of
the defendant relationships, but that did not save it from being disqualified under the "hot-potato"
doctrine. The terminated relationship also required disqualification under the substantial relationship
test. Various innovative steps proposed by the firm to alleviate some of the consequences could not
cure the conflict, which was also deemed not to be covered by a broad advance waiver provision.
142.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

121 cmt. b (AM. LAW

INST. 2000).
143. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(7) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
144. See NEW YORK RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmts. 1-18, r. 1.10 cmts. 13-18D (N.Y.
STATE BAR Ass'N 2014).
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took a pragmatic approach that emphasized the ethical requirement and
practical need to do conflicts checks and other due diligence. 145
D.

The IntractableImputationRule and Infectious Imputation

An underlying source of some of the problems of conflicts
identification is the strict rule on imputation of conflicts and the frequent
unavailability of measures to overcome that imputation. The
professional responsibility rules impute one lawyer's conflicts to every
"associated" lawyer in a firm, even when the personally conflicted
lawyer is in a far different office, has not had contact with confidential
information in many years, or is a recent lateral now working on
unrelated matters.1 46 The ABA adopted a rule to allow screening for
lateral conflicts, and courts (particularly federal courts) have allowed
screening to cure relatively minor, technical conflicts with no real risk of
transmission of confidences.147 But as we have seen in cases of
perceived side-switching or where access to arguably significant
confidential information seems probable, even if limited and many years
in the past, the courts have tended to apply the imputation rule with
rigor. This rigorous application of the imputation rule has led to the
courts creating an irrebuttable, or virtually irrebuttable, presumption of
the transmission of confidential information14 1 or finding small and
virtually inevitable glitches in the screening process fatal. 149
Nor is disqualification of the firm with the tainted attorney
necessarily the end of the matter. As we saw in the j2 Communications
145. See id.
146. No rule clearly deals with hiring laterals who are not lawyers or who are now lawyers but
acted in a paralegal or law clerk capacity at another firm. A recent Georgia State Supreme Court
opinion and New York State Bar ethics opinion find no impediment to screening and contain useful
discussions of the steps to be taken. See Hodge v. URFA-Sexton, LP, 758 S.E.2d 314, 319-23 (Ga.
2014); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 905 (2012). Logical as these outcomes
seem, they are not clearly dictated by the professional responsibility rules and may lead to a
different answer in some jurisdictions or distinctions between paralegals on the one hand and law
clerks working while awaiting admission to the bar on the other. See Prof'1 Ethics Comm. for the
State Bar of Tex., Op. 644 (2014); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

123 cmt. f.
147. See, e.g., Nat'l Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Onron Oilfield & Marine, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 751,
767, 767 n. 11 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2014); Transcript at 34-36, In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust
Litig., No. 1:13-md-02476 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2013), ECF No. 244; Lutron Elecs. Co., Inc. v.
Creston, No. 2:09-CV-707, 2010 WL 4720693, at *2-4 (D. Utah Nov. 12, 2010); Stipulation
Walling Off Mr. Jeffrey Miller, supra note 140.
148. See State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M Company, 845 N.W.2d 808, 816 n.4 (Minn. 2014); j2
Global Commc'ns Inc. v. Captaris Inc., No. CV 09-04150, 2012 WL 6618272, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal.
2012); Kirk v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 635 (Ct. App. 2010).
149. See Georgia Am. Alloys, Inc. v. White & Case LLP, [2014] EWHC (Comm) 94 [85]-[86];
j2 Global Commc'ns Inc., 2012 WL 6618272, at * 10.
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case, a breach or presumed breach of confidentiality may extend beyond
a firm and infect co-counsel or others "associated" in the representation
who were otherwise uninvolved in the circumstances giving rise to the
disqualification.15 0 This doctrine of infectious imputation creates an
added dimension of risk for attorneys and their unsuspecting clients.
Knowledge may come too late for potential inoculation or cure through
screening, and application can be harsh and mechanical indeed.
Consider the Texas case of In re CAH Homes, Inc. 1 ' The newly
elected County Attorney of Duval County prepared to bring a case
involving fraudulent practices against CMH in connection with "land-inlien" homeowner mortgage financing transactions. 5 2 The County
Attorney had represented CMH in connection with the same issues
several years before in his own, non-government practice.' 53 To solve
any conflicts problem, the County Attorney engaged two private
attorneys who had brought many of the suits against CMH,
and they filed the County's complaint against CMH on which
the County Attorney also appeared.' 54 When CMH objected to the
County Attorney's appearance on the papers, the County Attorney
withdrew."' CMH argued that the two outside attorneys should also be
disqualified because of their association with the County Attorney in
bringing the suit."s5
5
The record suggested that
A Texas appellate court agreed.s'
no confidential information had been exchanged and that any
interaction between the County Attorney and the specially retained
attorneys had been limited to discussion of fee arrangements. The
court nevertheless ruled that an association within the meaning
of the rule had existed, and that the presumption of passage of
confidential information was irrebuttable. 8
E.

The Termination Question

Because the U.S. concurrent client conflicts rule is so much stricter
than the former client conflicts rule, applying to broadly defined adverse
(or in New York, differing) interests and not requiring a substantial or

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
No. 04-13-00050-CV, 2013 WL 2446724 (Tex. App. June 5, 2013).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *5-6.
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indeed any relationship between potentially conflicting matters,' 59 a
great deal may hinge on the characterization of a client as a former, as
opposed to, a current client. But often, as we saw in the ParallelIron16 0
case and to some extent the Swanson'6' case, the issue may be far from
clear cut. Lawyers, in this author's experience, have an almost visceral
dislike for sending termination letters, and if they send such letters at all,
they may not do so until circumstances virtually compel them to try to
do something-making the gesture probably too little, too late and as
likely to add fuel to a fire as to quench it.
The N.Y. State Bar sought to address the following almost
archetypical question in a recent opinion:
If a law firm represented an entity in a matter and has not performed
any legal services for the entity for more than a year, but the law firm
has not sent a termination letter to the entity, may the law firm
represent new clients against the entity, over the entity's objection, in a
new matter that is related in some ways to the original matter? 62
The committee concluded that failure to send a termination letter to a
client does not, in and of itself, mean that the attorney-client relationship
continues. 16 Whether a representation is over can be determined by
passage of time, and whether there has been a long-standing pattern of
representation by the lawyer or firm of the client over the years. 16 4 The
opinion also emphasizes that a key factor is whether a client may have a
reasonable belief that the law firm needs to perform more work to fulfill
its obligations.1 65 Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, the committee
could not provide a more definitive answer to the question it posed,
regarding it as partly a question of law which it could not answer and
partly a question of fact which would vary from case to case.1 6 6
The question of termination is often a crucial one because of the
strictness of the concurrent client rule as opposed to the rule for former
clients. In the latter situation, but not the former, a substantial
159.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 17 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).

160. No. 12-874, 2013 WL 789207 (D. Del. Mar. 4, 2013); see discussion supra notes 63-72.
161. 845 N.w.2d 808 (Minn. 2014); see supra notes 42-62.
162. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 1008 (2014). The opinion also notes
that even when a representation is formally terminated, the lawyer must understand that all duties to
former clients do not end. Id In such a situation, the conflict might not be treated as a concurrent
client conflict, but Rule 1.9(a) prevents a lawyer from representing a client in the same, or a
substantially related, matter, or using confidential information learned in the engagement to the
detriment of the former client. Id.

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss2/15

24

Kobak: Dealing With Conflicts And Disqualification Risks Professionally

2015]

DEALING WITH CONFLICTS

521

relationship between matters is required.16 7 Requiring some relationship
between matters for concurrent client conflicts would in many cases
moot the difficulties and uncertainty of having to decide the termination
question. The fact that so much may turn on the question of whether
someone who was a client last week is still a client this week highlights
how arbitrarily the concurrent client rule may sometimes work in
practice. Until and unless the rules change, however, the dichotomy
between treatment of present and former clients for conflicts and
disqualification purposes calls for diligence and clarity in documenting
terminated engagements.
F.

Prospective Clients

Similar issues arise from interactions with would-be or prospective
clients that never become actual clients. But here, while the standard is
still largely client-centric and caution is very much in order, the rule is a
good deal more forgiving.
A recent New York appellate decision, Mayers v. Stone Castle
Partners, LLC, illustrates the new standards.16 8 Stone Castle Partners,
LLC ("SCP") fired Matthew Mayers, a member and investor of SCP,
after it learned that Mayers engaged in financial transactions that
allegedly constituted a breach of his duties to the company. 169 SCP
retained Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP ("Quinn") to
represent it against Mayers. Mayers commenced an action against SCP
for wrongful termination and also sought to disqualify Quinn. 170 Mayers
based his disqualification motion on the fact that six months prior to
SCP's retention of Quinn, Mayers called a Quinn attorney and asked that
attorney to represent him in transactions relevant to the circumstances of
his termination. 17 ' Though the Quinn attorney declined the
representation, he discussed his conversation with another Quinn
attorney involved in the SCP representation. 172
The trial court granted Mayers's motion to disqualify, emphasizing
that details of the conversation were quoted in the complaint.',7 The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reversed, holding
that under Rule 1.18 of the New York Rules of ProfessionalConduct,
167. Id.
168. 1 N.Y.S.3d 58 (App. Div. 2015).
169. Id at 60.
170. Id
171. Id at 60-61.
172. Id at 61.
173. See Mayers v. Stone Castle Partners, LLC, No. 650410, 2014 WL 1258259, at *4, *6
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 2014).
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"where a prospective client consults an attorney who ultimately
represents a party adverse to the prospective client in matters that are
substantially related to the consultation," the attorney should be
disqualified "only if it is shown that the information related in the
conversation 'could be significantly harmful"' to the client. 7 4 The court
found the information disclosed in the complaint to be no real
The court distinguished a
secret and not significantly harmful.'
decided
under the prior rule in
that
were
number of prior cases
New York,"' which, when it was applicable, required only that the
information be confidential, but not that it also be "significantly
harmful" to the client. 77
IV.

RECENT TYPE

2 CONFLICTS CASES

In my general taxonomy, Type 2 conflicts issues are those that
become issues only because of the rigid nature of the concurrent client
conflicts rules and those which arise even in the absence of a substantial
relationship between matters. These cases do not involve the potentially
significant issues of loyalty and confidentiality that some courts perceive
in Type 1 cases. Instead, the conflict exists independent of a substantial
relationship and seems, in many cases, to not seriously implicate
protection of either professional values or interests of clients. In fact, in
many ways, the outcomes seem antithetical to the concerns for client
autonomy and choice of counsel that inform much of current ethics
thinking. The interests of at least two clients are at stake in every
174. Mayers, 1 N.Y.S.3d at 62 (quoting NEW YORK RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.18(c)
(N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 2014)).
175. Id
176. Id at 61 (citing Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, N.Y. Branch, 934 N.Y.S.2d 807
(App. Div. 2011)); Bank Hapoalim B.M. v. WestLB AG, 918 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 2011).
177. A New York City Bar Opinion contains a useful explication of the balance the new
Rule 1.18 strikes. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 960 (2013). Restrictions apply
to use of information if the attorney does not take steps (as they should and many do) to avoid
receiving confidential information in the first place. But if confidences are imparted, a possibly
disqualifying conflict occurs only if the information received could be "significantly harmful" to the
firm's client. Id. The restrictions in Rule 1.18 are thus narrower than the restrictions on adverse
representation with respect to former and current clients. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'1
Ethics, Op. 1067 (July 2015).
Two important additional exceptions apply. First, if both the prospective client and the
affected client give informed consent in writing, the lawyer and the firm may take on the
representation that would otherwise be prohibited. Second, even if the individual lawyer is
disqualified, the lawyer's firm may take on the representation as long as the disqualified lawyer
took reasonable steps to limit his or her exposure to the disqualifying information and the firm
implements an ethical screen, notifying the client and prospective client of the representation and
the screening measures that will be implemented. A similar screening mechanism is not available to
lawyers in New York (except by consent) for former client conflicts.
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disqualification motion, and every decision granting a motion deprives at
least one client of its lawyer of choice. Resolution of conflicts
issues also poses significant costs for clients and courts. In formulating
and applying fair and workable conflicts rules, all these interests
should be considered.
An example of this somewhat hyper-technical type of conflict is
apparent in McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Duane Morris,
LLP.7 s There, McKesson Corp. ("McKesson") had a number of
subsidiaries, including McKesson Automation, Inc. ("MAI"), McKesson
Mediation Management, Inc. ("MMM"), and McKesson Information
Solutions, LLC ("MIS").' MAI and MIS were part of the same
McKesson business segment, known as McKesson Provider
Technologies ("MPT").'8 s Duane Morris, LLP ("Duane Morris")
undertook to serve as local counsel for MMM and MAI as creditors with
claims in a bankruptcy in Pennsylvania."' The representation letter with
MMM and MAI contained a broad waiver, which did not identify
specific adverse clients or details of adverse representation. Different
lawyers in a different office of Duane Morris also represented two
individuals named Smith in an arbitration in Georgia filed against MIS.
Because MAI and MIS were both part of MPT, the same internal staff
monitored both the Smith arbitration and the bankruptcy matter.' 82 MIS
moved to disqualify Duane Morris from representing the Smiths, based
on its concurrent representation of MAI and MMM.'"
The court enjoined Duane Morris from acting as counsel for the
Smiths, determining that although the subsidiary McKesson entities
were distinct legal entities for contract and liability purposes, they
constituted a single entity for purposes of conflicts of interest analysis.18 4
Because Duane Morris's representation of the Smiths was adverse to the
interests of MPT, which included MAI, there was technically a conflict
of interest. The court determined that the broad, standard advance waiver
language contained in Duane Morris's engagement letter did not qualify
as a knowing waiver because it did not identify specific adverse clients
or details of possible adverse representation.'
178. Order on Verified Complaint for Emergency Injunctive Relief and Disqualification of
Duane Morris, LLP, McKesson Info. Sols., Inc. v. Duane Morris, LLP, No. 2006CV121110 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2006).
179. Id. at 1-2.
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id
182. Id at4.
183. Id.
184. Id at 5, 7.
185. Id at 11.
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The court admitted that "modem business practices in this age of
parent companies with worldwide subsidiaries, mergers and acquisitions
makes this conflicts of interest issue one of great importance," but
ultimately concluded as a matter of interpreting the ethics rules that the
"possibility of breach of loyalty and of possible disclosure of
information that may adversely affect MIS in the impending arbitration
is too significant to be overlooked . .""' It enjoined the firm from
continuing to represent the adverse parties in the arbitration."s' Duane
Morris subsequently terminated its representation of the McKesson
entities in the bankruptcy matter and then moved to vacate the injunction
barring it from representing the Smiths on the basis that its
representation of the McKesson entities was no longer concurrent."1 8
The court granted the motion, noting that "to bar an attorney from
representing a client who may have some distant interest in conflict with
another current or former client, especially in an era of flourishing
companies and multi-office law firms, is inherently unreasonable." 8
This statement seems as clear an indictment of the unnecessary
rigor of the parochial U.S. concurrent client conflicts rule as there
could be. No substantial relationship or confidential client information
was even remotely at stake, and nothing was materially different the
day the minor bankruptcy involvement terminated from what it had been
the day before.
The characterization of what entity a law firm represents is often
determinative, as it was in McKesson Information Solutions,190 and leads
to varied results in the interpretation of engagement letters. In GSI
Commerce Solutions, Inc. v. BabyCenter, L.L.C., Johnson & Johnson
("J&J") had engaged Blank Rome, LLP ("Blank Rome") for guidance
on privacy and compliance matters. 191 In the original engagement letter,
as well as in a later amendment to it, Blank Rome included provisions
under which J&J prospectively waived all conflicts arising out of Blank
Rome's representation of generic drug manufacturer clients in patent
matters adverse to J&J and its affiliates.192 In 2006, BabyCenter, L.L.C.
("BabyCenter"), a wholly owned subsidiary of J&J, entered into a five186. Id at 4, 12.
187. Id. at 12.
188. Order on Motion for New Trial and to Vacate the Permanent Injunction and to Dismiss on
the Grounds that the Controversy Is Not Moot at 3-4, McKesson Info. Sols., Inc. v. Duane Morris,
LLP, No. 2006CV121 110 (Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2007).
189. Id. at 9.
190. Order on Verified Complaint for Emergency Injunctive Relief and Disqualification of
Duane Morris, LLP, supra note 178.
191. 618 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2010).
192. Id. at 206-07.
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year agreement with GSI Commerce Solutions, Inc. ("GSI"), pursuant to
which GSI agreed to run the day-to-day operations of BabyCenter's
online store."' In 2009, BabyCenter closed its online store.1 94 GSI
accused BabyCenter of wrongfully terminating the agreement and
sought mediation in accordance with the agreement, engaging Blank
Rome to represent it in the contract dispute.' 95 After mediation proved
unsuccessful, GSI, again in accordance with the agreement, sought to
arbitrate the matter with Blank Rome as its counsel."' At this point
BabyCenter filed a motion to disqualify Blank Rome, asserting that for
purposes of the conflicts analysis, J&J and BabyCenter must be
considered essentially the same client and that Blank Rome's
representation of GSI presented a concurrent client conflict with J&J,
which it did not consent to waive. 97
Blank Rome took the position that although it represented J&J, it
did not represent BabyCenter-a J&J affiliate. The district court rejected
this argument in harsh and rather dogmatic language.' The Second
Circuit affirmed, though in somewhat more measured tones, concluding
that the operational commonality between the affiliated entities was
sufficient to establish a corporate affiliate conflict and that Blank
Rome's representation of GSI .'reasonably diminishe[d] the level of
confidence and trust in counsel held by' J&J."' 9 The court further
determined that Blank Rome's waiver language in its engagement letter
was insufficient to establish J&J's consent to the corporate affiliate
conflict, because the waiver was limited to matters involving patent
litigation.200 The court rejected Blank Rome's argument that the client
definition in the engagement letter had given Blank Rome carte blanche
to accept representation adverse to J&J affiliates that were not separately
Blank Rome's clients, determining that the language "simply is not plain
enough or clear enough" to support this argument.20' In a disturbing
aside, it commented that including such language might raise ethical
questions in itself.202

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
2009).
199.
London
200.
201.
202.

Id at 207-08.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id at 208-09.
GSI Commerce Sols., Inc. v. BabyCenter, L.L.C., 644 F. Supp. 2d 333, 335-37 (S.D.N.Y.
GSI Commerce Sols., Inc., 618 F.3d at 212 (quoting Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,
v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 914, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2003)).
Id. at 212-13.
Id. at 214.
Id.
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By contrast, in GaldermaLaboratories,L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atlantic
LLC, Vinson & Elkins LLP's ("Vinson & Elkins") engagement letter
with Galderma Laboratories, L.P. ("Galderma") contained a broad
waiver clause, waiving any conflicts except those where: (1) the matter
was substantially related to the firm's representation of Galderma; or (2)
there was a reasonable probability that confidential information
furnished to Vinson & Elkins could be used to Galderma's
disadvantage. 203 Galderma's general counsel-a lawyer with over
twenty years of experience as an attorney and over ten years of
experience as a general counsel-signed the engagement letter.204
Galderma, represented by different counsel, filed an IP suit against
Actavis Mid Atlantic, LLC ("Actavis"), a company whose entities
Vinson & Elkins had represented in IP matters for six years.205 Vinson
Elkins filed an answer and counterclaim for Actavis, after which
Galderma's general counsel requested that Vinson & Elkins withdraw. 206
Instead, Vinson & Elkins withdrew from further representation of
Galderma in unrelated matters, relying on the language contained in its
engagement letter.207 Galderma then sought to have Vinson & Elkins
disqualified, but the court sided with Vinson & Elkins and determined
that Galderma had given informed consent to Vinson & Elkins's future
representation in unrelated matters such as the Actavis lawsuit. 208 The
court acknowledged that its determination rested in part on the level of
sophistication of Galderma, which weighed in favor of allowing a more
open-ended waiver to suffice as informed consent.209 it is probably
worth noting that if the court had not upheld the waiver, Actavis would
have been denied the assistance of its regular IP litigation counsel in a
case filed against it.
In Macy's Inc. v. JC. Penny Corp., a New York appellate court
took a similar approach to a remote conflict. 2 10 Jones Day represented

Macy's, Inc. in a lawsuit against J.C. Penney Corp. ("J.C. Penney")
relating to a dispute regarding Martha Stewart's home goods. Jones Day,
through separate lawyers, also represented J.C. Penney with respect to IP
litigation and trademark registration in Asia. 2 11 J.C. Penney moved to

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

927 F. Supp. 2d 390, 393 (N.D. Tex. 2013).
Id.
Id at 394.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 394,406.
Id at 401-03.
968 N.Y.S.2d 64 (App. Div. 2013).
Id. at 65.
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disqualify Jones Day on the basis of a concurrent client conflict.2 12 Jones
Day's engagement letter with J.C. Penney contained a provision that
informed J.C. Penney about the possibility that Jones Day's present or
future clients "may be direct competitors of [J.C. Penney] or otherwise
may have business interests that are contrary to [J.C. Penney]'s
interests," and "may seek to engage [Jones Day] in connection with an
actual or potential transaction or pending or potential litigation or other
dispute resolution proceeding in which such client's interests are or
potentially may become adverse to [J.C. Penney]'s interests."2 13 The
agreement went on to state that "your instructing us or continuing to
instruct us on this matter will constitute your full acceptance of the terms
set out above and attached." 2 14
The court held that the language in the engagement letter, along
with J.C. Penney's decision to continue to engage Jones Day, amounted
to a waiver of the alleged conflict.2 15 The court relied in part on the
sophistication of the parties and the actions of J.C. Penney's
general counsel. The general counsel had not actually signed the
letter but had negotiated other language and gave equivocal testimony
about her attitude toward the waiver. The court held that all these
factors together were enough to find a knowing waiver for such minor
unrelated matters. 1
V.

AN ASIDE ON POSITIONAL CONFLICTS

Positional or subject matter conflicts present issues of their own,
which have also begun to receive court attention, as some litigants more
aggressively pursue disqualification motions based on asserted conflicts.
Traditionally, it would not necessarily be considered a conflict of
interest for a firm to argue a position in one case that might be
inconsistent with the position or interests of another client in other
matters.2 17 In the case In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust
Litigation, Latham represented Union Pacific Railroad Co. ("Union
Pacific"), one of the four defendants in a class action antitrust lawsuit for
212. Id.
213. Id
214. Id.
215. Id. at 65-66.
216. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Mfg. Co., No. B256314, 2016 WL
364742, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016) (reaching opposite conclusion on somewhat
similar facts and holding broad advance waiver ineffective as consent to undisclosed concurrent
client conflict).
217. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 468 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (D. Conn.
2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
INST. 2000).
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conspiracy to raise rail prices for shipping customers.2 18 Separately,
Latham also represented Oxbow, an affected shipper, on a variety of
transactional matters unrelated to the antitrust suit. 2 19 Oxbow was an
unnamed plaintiff class member in the antitrust litigation. It filed a
separate lawsuit against the railroad companies with virtually the same
allegations as made in the class action, but had not yet technically opted
out of the class action. 2 2 0 Latham specifically did not represent Union
Pacific in this separate litigation. When Oxbow learned of Latham's
representation of Union Pacific in the class action, it moved to disqualify
Latham on the ground that the firm would be advocating positions in the
class action adverse to the interests of Oxbow in its own parallel suit.22 1
The court refused to disqualify Latham; Oxbow's status as an unnamed
class member in the class action did not create a conflict, and the court
regarded Oxbow's own parallel action as a distinct matter in which
Latham was not representing the adverse party. 2 22

In some cases, however, the harm to another client may be seen as
more tangible than simply being on the other side of an issue in a
different but related case. In Celgard, LLC v. LG Chem, Ltd., Celgard,
LLC ("Celgard"), a manufacturer of lithium battery components,
brought suit against LG Chem, Ltd. ("LG Chem"), seeking damages and
injunctive relief stemming from LG Chem's alleged infringement of
Celgard's patent. 22 3 The injunctive relief would have prevented LG
Chem from continuing directly or indirectly to sell its batteries to
customers, including Apple, Inc. ("Apple"). Jones Day, which
represented Apple in other matters, entered an appearance on behalf of
Celgard, representing to the court that it would not represent or counsel
Celgard in any matter adverse to Apple, including licensing negotiations.
Apple intervened and moved to disqualify Jones Day.224
Despite the absence of direct party adversity and Jones Day's
attempt to avoid disqualification by limiting its representation (as
Latham had successfully done In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge
Antitrust Litigation),2 25 the Federal Circuit determined in an opinion
218. 965 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106-07 (D.D.C. 2013).
219. Id. at 107.
220. Id. at 108-09.
221. Id at 109-10.
222. Id at 112-18. Similar issues arise in bankruptcy when a trustee may have similar
affirmative claims or claim defenses against a number of parties, one or more of which it may
represent in unrelated matters. It is customary to appoint, and for the court to approve, special
counsel for those matters despite the overlay of issues.
223. 594 F. App'x 669, 670-71 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
224. Id. at 671.
225. 965 F. Supp. 2d at 106-07.
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labeled "nonprecedential" that Jones Day's representation of Celgard
was directly adverse to the interests of Apple. 226 According to the court,
Apple now faced both the possibility of needing to find a new battery
supplier and the possibility that Celgard could use the injunction issue as
leverage in licensing negotiations with Apple. 227 This, in the Federal
Circuit's view, was far more concrete and immediate harm than the
ordinary positional conflict. Similar conflicts arguments have been
raised in other cases, particularly in the IP area, creating additional
uncertainty and complexity to conflicts screening procedures.228
VI.

SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE RULES

Two aspects of the conflicts rules, as they exist in most of the
United States, seem inordinately strict. First is the fact that any adverse
(or in New York, differing) interest creates a disqualifying conflict even
when the interests may not be materially adverse, when there is no
substantial relationship between matters, and when there is no likelihood
whatsoever of misuse of confidential information.22 9 This is a very broad
and arbitrary standard. It is made worse by the tendency of some courts
to apply this broad rule of disqualification to many affiliates, and the
uncertainty that arises from that effort.230 In turn, that has led many

&

226. Celgard, 594 F. App'x at 670-71.
227. Id at 671-72.
228. On December 26, 2014, the Massachusetts Supreme Court solicited amicus curiae briefs
on the following question in a malpractice action:
ANNOUNCEMENT: The Justices are soliciting amicus briefs. Whether, under Mass. R.
Prof C. 1.7, an actionable conflict of interest arose when, according to the allegations in
the complaint, attorneys in different offices of the same law firm simultaneously
represented the plaintiffs and a competitor in prosecuting patents on similar inventions,
without informing the plaintiffs or obtaining their consent to the simultaneous
representation.
Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth Case Docket, Chris E. Maling v. Finnegan,
Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP & Others, SJC-11800, SUPREME JUD. CT.
APPEALS CT. MASS., http://www.ma-appellatecourts.org/displaydocket.php?dno=SJC-l 1800 (last
updated Feb. 3, 2016). Ultimately, the court concluded that "simultaneous representation by a law
firm in the prosecution of patents for two clients competing in the same technology area for similar
inventions is not a per se violation" of Massachusetts Rule 1.7. Maling v. Finnegan, Henderson,
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, 42 N.E.3d 199, 201 (Mass. 2015) (emphasis added). The court
noted that conflicts could arise where conflicting patents would be the subject of an interference,
where an attorney was asked to opine on the merits of one client's patent position vis a vis that of
the other client, or where an attorney would "sharef' the claims pursued for one client because of
knowledge or concerns for the claims of the other client. Id. at 202-03 (quoting SWS Fin. Fund A v.
Salomon Bros., 790 F. Supp. 1392, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1992)). Noting that none of these potential
conflicts claims was alleged, the Court dismissed the malpractice complaint. Id. at 208-09.
229. See, e.g., NEW YORK RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N 2014);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).
230. Compare Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Actavis Mid AtI. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394, 406
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clients to create guidelines or engagement letters of their own,
demanding that a lawyer or firm is to consider virtually every related
entity the "client" even though the engagement has nothing to do with
the actual client. Additionally, the guidelines or engagement letters
clients have created often indicate that the definition of client may go
beyond what the law would regard as a sufficient unity of interests to
qualify. These letters may-although admittedly some do not-also
refuse to waive even the most attenuated conflicts in advance, leaving
their decision to a vague expectation that someone will be willing and
able to consider them on behalf of the overall corporate entity.
This is an expectation too often unfulfilled on a timely enough basis to
be useful. This approach also ignores the fact that confidentiality
concerns may sometimes prevent the lawyer from seeking a waiver at a
later time, even though there is no prospect of a material impact on the
existing client's interests.
A second contributing factor is the breadth of the imputation rule,
coupled with the strong, if not irrebuttable, presumption that confidential
information seen by one lawyer within a firm has been available to every
associated lawyer within the same firm. This problem is then further
compounded by the failure of the professional responsibility rules to
recognize screening as a means to cure conflicts in the absence of
consent except for prospective client conflicts, and in some states (but
not many others, such as New York) for some lateral conflicts. 2 31
VII.

AMELIORATING DOCTRINES

Because their overriding concern is with the proceedings before
them and not enforcement or implementation of every technicality in the
state professional responsibility codes, courts apply discretion in how
they rule on conflicts to assure the fairness and efficiency of
proceedings, discourage tactical gamesmanship, and respect client
choice of counsel. For convenience, I call these "ameliorating doctrines"
and divide them into five categories. 232 These doctrines smooth some of
the hardest edges of the conflicts rules in some cases, but they
are not in any sense a solution to the problems posed by arbitrary rules.
The results they produce are uncertain and unpredictable, and are
(N.D. Tex. 2013), and Macy's Inc. v. J.C. Penny Corp., 968 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65-66 (App. Div. 2013),
with GSI Commerce Sols., Inc. v. BabyCenter, L.L.C., 618 F.3d 204, 208-09, 214 (2d Cir. 2010),
and Celgene Corp. v. KV Pharm. Co., 2008 WL 2937415, at *1-3, *14 (D.N.J. July 29, 2008).
231. Erin A. Cohn, The Use of Screens to Cure Imputed Conflicts of Interest: Why the
American Bar Association's and Most State Bar Associations' Failure to Allow Screening
Undermines the Integrity of the Legal Profession, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 367, 370-75 (2006).
232. See infra Part VII.A-B.
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achieved only at great cost in terms of additional motion practice and
discovery. They represent a useful but ad hoc response to an issue in
need of systematic attention.
A.

Advance Waivers

As we have seen, broad waivers are sometimes accepted and
sometimes not, depending on the severity of the underlying conflict, the
sophistication of the client, and other factors such as the timing of the
disqualification motion.233 More specific waivers may be respected, but
sometimes are interpreted in ways that may not have been anticipated or
that actually limit their application for the specific conflict at issue. The
utility of advance waivers has also been limited by some clients' blanket
refusal to consider them.
B.

Screens

Screens may be employed as fail-safes even when the ethics rules
do not specifically permit them. The courts may or may not accept them,
depending on whether they consider the presumption that confidential
information will be shared, rebuttable or not.234 Very small missteps or
delays in implementing a screen can also doom its efficacy.2 35
C. Delay/Implied Waiver
A long line of judicial decisions decries the use of disqualification
motions as a disfavored litigation tactic in many cases.236 As we saw in
the Swanson case, for example, the courts may find it possible to waive a
conflict from unexplained delay in raising it, even when they will not
indulge in a more general balancing of the equities.2 37
233. See discussion infra Part IV.
234. See j2 Global Commc'ns, Inc. v. Captaris Inc., No. CV 09-04150, 2012 WL 6618272, at
*9-10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) ("Once there is a presumption that a firm possesses confidential
information, generally that presumption is rebuttable and disqualification is compelled.").
235. See, e.g., id. at *10 (finding the ethical screen unsuccessful because it was implemented
too late); Georgian Am. Alloys Inc. v. White & Case LLP, [2014] EWHC (Comm) 94, [85] (Eng.)
(finding screen unsuccessful because it was implemented too late).
236. See HLP Properties, LLC v. Consol. Editson Co. of N.Y., No. 14 Civ. 01383, 2014 WL
5285926, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2014) ("Courts in this Circuit show 'considerable reluctance to
disqualify attorneys' because .. . 'disqualification motions are often interposed for tactical reasons
[a]nd even when made in the best of faith ... inevitably cause delay."' (quoting Bd. of Ed. v.
Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979))).
237. See State ex rel. Swanson v. 3M Co., No. A12-1856, 2013 WL 3284285, at *5-6 (Minn.
July 1, 2013). For a recent example, see Robert Bosch HealthcareSys., Inc. v. Cardiocom, LLC, No.
C-14-1575, 2014 WL 2703807, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014) (suggesting a lack of belief that
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"Thrust Upon" Conflicts

Courts sometimes invoke the notion of a "thrust upon" conflict to
avoid a disqualification that seems unfair to a lawyer. The doctrine of
"thrust upon" conflicts proceeds from the premise that a lawyer and her
client should not be disadvantaged through conflicts that emerge from
corporate actions, such as mergers or acquisitions, that take place after
an engagement has begun and over which the lawyer had no control.
In Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Cardiocom, LLC, for
example, the court refused to find that a disqualifying conflict existed
because an affiliate acquired by a client after the engagement began had
commenced litigation against another established client of the law firm
involved.2 38 Disqualification based on a situation essentially created by
the unilateral action of one client seems fundamentally unfair to the
lawyer and the other client.2 39
E.

The Catch-All: Courts' ControlofProceedingsBefore Them

Courts also ameliorate the arbitrariness of the conflicts rules by
phrasing the inquiry as one of control of the fairness and conduct of
attorneys in proceedings before them and looking to the state ethics rules
only as one source of guidance. Even when a conflict is apparent, if no
party will be prejudiced by the conflict, the court may find no
compelling reason to disqualify a party's counsel of choice. In HLP
Properties, LLC v. Consolidated Editson Co. of New York, Inc. for
example, attorneys in the New York office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP ("Gibson Dunn") represented plaintiffs in a suit against
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. ("Con Ed NY") involving a
parcel of land in New York.240 Before that representation began,
Consolidated Edison, Inc. ("CEI"), Con Ed NY's parent company, had
retained a Gibson Dunn corporate partner in the firm's Washington,

party had not known of a conflict for two years or more before moving for disqualification and
citing delay as one of several factors weighing against disqualification).
238. See Robert Bosch HealthcareSys., 2014 WL 2703807 at *1-2,*8.
239. The District of Columbia Bar Association has a well-known opinion on the subject ("DC
Bar Opinion"). See D.C. Bar, Op. 356 (2010). The opinion states that "if a conflict not reasonably
foreseeable at the outset of representation arises under paragraph (b)(1) [of Rule 1.7] after the
representation commences, and is not waived under paragraph (c), a lawyer need not withdraw from
any representation" unless the representation or the lawyer's professional judgment is likely to be
adversely affected by representation of another client. Id. In the example set forth in the DC Bar
Opinion, confidentiality concerns prevented the lawyer from disclosing her conflicting
representation and obtaining informed consent, but the opinion concludes that continued
representation would be proper absent adverse effect on either relationship. Id
240. 2014 WL 5285926, at *1.
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D.C. office with respect to corporate governance matters. 2 41 The
engagement letter defined CEI as the client, and stipulated that "[u]nless
expressly agreed, [Gibson Dunn is] not undertaking the representation of
any related or affiliated person or entity, nor any family member, parent
corporation or entity, subsidiary, or affiliated corporation or entity, nor
any of [CEI's] officers, directors, agents, partners or employees." 24 2
After the corporate secretary of CEI learned that Gibson Dunn
represented the plaintiffs in the suit against Con Ed NY, Gibson Dunn
sought a waiver of any conflict from CEI, but CEI refused to grant it and
moved for disqualification in the New York real estate case.243
The court rejected Con Ed NY's argument that Gibson Dunn
represented it directly under the engagement letter, even though the
work performed for CEI concededly could benefit Con Ed NY
indirectly. 24 The court did find, however, that Con Ed NY and CEI had
sufficient unity of interests to be considered one for purposes of conflicts
analysis. 245 This placed on Gibson Dunn the burden to show no divided
loyalty or diminution of the vigor of its representation for either client.
The court found it somewhat troubling that Gibson Dunn had not
obtained a waiver when it first undertook to represent CEI but still found
no reason to disqualify the firm.246 Risk of trial taint did not exist
because the dual representations involved unrelated subjects, different
Gibson Dunn attorneys in different departments and different offices,
and no inside knowledge relevant to the plaintiffs litigation. 247 The
court was also wary that the timing of Con Ed NY's disqualification
motion suggested that it was being used to gain a tactical advantage-in
this case because it was filed almost immediately, rather than after any
discussion or after a long delay, as is typical.2 48 The court also feared
that plaintiffs would suffer significant prejudice if the disqualification
were to be granted, while Con Ed NY would experience scarcely any if
it were denied.249

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *1-2.
at *1.
at *2-3
at *4.

245.

Id. at *4-5.

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
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APPROACHING TODAY'S CONFLICTS RULES PROFESSIONALLY

Some, though not all, of the Type I conflicts cases reveal possible
missteps by counsel, albeit sometimes unintentionally given real world,
real time information constraints. The rules may sometimes be overly
rigid, and courts may be unduly skeptical of curative measures like
screening. But no one would tolerate a system of rules that allowed a
firm to be cavalier in identifying or investigating serious concerns when
they arise or attacking or explaining away a firm's own prior work for a
one-time client that is now an adversary. The duty of confidentiality is
real. So is the duty of loyalty when there is serious adversity and a
relationship in which a law firm actually switches sides.
Under any set of rules, firms can-and should-exercise greater
vigilance and precautions than may have been the case in some of the
Type 1 cases. They must also react with diligence and care when a
potentially serious problem is discovered or pointed out to them by an
adversary. The interests of the clients on both sides, as well as those of
the law firm, suffer when lawyers stonewall or grow too cavalier. Some
conflicts are intractable and hard to detect, but serious conflicts
problems are a consequence of professional growth and success, and
they should be handled diligently and professionally.
The situation with respect to what I have called Type 2 cases is
different. For the most part, these cases involve unrelated, sometimes
minor work of no significance to the litigation in which the motion is
made. These situations do not generally generate significant loyalty or
confidentiality concerns and may become an issue simply as a tactical
matter, fueled perhaps by the rancor that the litigation process itself may
engender. Counsel should still, of course, be vigilant and treat these
issues seriously as long as the rules are as they are. If they do act
reasonably, some of what I have called the ameliorating doctrines may
also come to their aid. There is, however, no guarantee that will
necessarily be so, and a problem of the rules for these largely superficial
conflicts questions is that it may cost attorneys and clients considerable
time and money to learn the answer.
Professionalism considerations apply to lawyers on both sides of
these issues-inside counsel confronted with a request for consent and
the outside lawyer whose firm may have a potential issue. These
considerations should-though they often do not-point lawyers
toward developing candid, reasonable, and procedurally efficient
approaches to discussing and resolving such issues wherever possible,
both after they have occurred and before, in circumstances when they
can be anticipated.
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Outside lawyers need to conduct serious due diligence and alert
clients to potential conflicts, when possible. Firms need to have robust
conflicts-checking systems and procedures-systems that not only
involve up-to-date software and well-trained reviewers, but also systems
or procedures that allow hints or questions about prior work or
relationships to be followed up by frank discussion of key lawyers
involved. Firms also must ensure that ethical screens and any
notifications or other curative steps are implemented effectively and
quickly. And to the extent possible, firms should discuss the issues and
steps to address them with the affected clients.
On the other hand, clients should also be willing to address issues
reasonably and quickly and not stand in the way of representations that
are immaterial to their interests. Among other things, they should discuss
and provide reasonable waivers and agree to letters describing what a
representation is truly about and in which the "client" is not defined
more broadly than the ethics rules require. Taking a long view,
clients benefit from being represented by successful firms with a
range of practices and expertise in their industries and, therefore, have
an independent interest in having a wide choice of firms not hampered
by conflicts.
Both sides should want a productive, respectful, candid
relationship. Both should recognize that taking arbitrary positions
scarcely fosters this relationship. In my view, taking hardline, arbitrary
positions on both sides may be the reason why so many of the nasty
disqualification disputes this Article has discussed have played out in the
courts in recent years.
All of this raises the question of what a reasonable approach to
conflicts should be. Some contours can be gleaned from the cases
examined above.250 First, counsel should never seek to act without
consent when there is a substantial relationship between matters-this is
the rule in most jurisdictions in the world. Counsel should not act if
doing so would likely involve the misuse of confidential information.
Second, counsel should not act if taking a position involves attacking or
rendering nugatory the attorney's or firm's former work for that client.
IX.

A BETTER SET OF RULES?

Given the rules that we have and the unlikelihood that they will
change in the near future, lawyers should behave to make their
application as reasonable and professional as possible. But, ideally, the

250. See supra Parts II1-[V.
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rules themselves should embody the above considerations. Proper
attention could then be focused on issues of substance rather than
squandered on peripheral matters. Specifically, the concurrent client
conflicts rule could be limited, as it is in so many parts of the world, to
matters having a substantial relationship to one another.2 51 A number of
Type 2 conflicts cases would then disappear overnight, saving a great
deal of angst, time, and money, and leading to more certain results. No
fundamental value would be compromised by this simple change.252
A second change would be to limit the imputation rule to
knowledge of confidential, material information and to allow reasonable
screening measures to defeat imputation and the presumption of leakage.
This change would produce more predictable results without seriously
jeopardizing any client interest.
Such changes in the rules should not, however, alter the rule that a
lawyer or law firm could never represent both clients in a litigation.
They should also be drafted in a manner that would prevent the type of
side-switching in which a law firm may potentially impugn work the
same firm previously performed for the client which is now
adverse. Drafters of rule changes might also be tasked with considering
having the rules address, more directly than they do now, when
or whether significant positional conflicts in areas such as IP should
be disqualifying.
Some may criticize this solution as an accommodation to larger
firms at the expense of smaller ones. But the argument is actually the
other way around. The concurrent client conflicts rule untethered to any
substantial relationship surely poses more problems for a solo
practitioner or small firm in a small town with one or two banks and a
few other repeat users of lawyers than it does for a firm with offices
around the globe and a world of potential clients. In either situation, a
large institution could unfairly exploit the rule to deny its adversaries
access to well-qualified counsel.
Moreover, to the extent that the present current client and
imputation rules penalize firms for growth and success or limit the
opportunities for both counsel and other users of legal services, they are
protectionist and anti-competitive.25 3 in any event, the objective of the
251.

Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013), with

Solicitors Regulation Auth. Code of Conduct 2011, c. 3.6 (Eng. & Wales).
252. A body of case law already exists that treats affiliate conflicts as "virtual conflicts" and
resolves them by application of the substantial relationship test. See Depalma & Borden, supranote
23, at 135-38.
253. Nor is screening as a fail-safe always a panacea even for the largest firms. It is not
costless or easy to implement, and in many fields the very people at the firm that a client would
come to a firm to retain in a certain type ofmatter are those who must be screened.
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rules should be to maximize all clients' ability to retain the most
effective legal representation they can. The concurrent client conflicts
and imputation rules could be revised to better serve that objective.
Some suggestions for doing so are set forth below. 25 4
X.

Two POSSIBLE CHANGES

Below, I present two potential changes to the ethics rules, in order
to serve the objective of maximizing clients' ability to retain the most
effective legal representative they can.
A.

Possible Change to Rule 1.7(a)

Rule 1.7(a) currently states:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a
client if a reasonable lawyer would conclude that either:
(1) the representation will involve the lawyer in representing
differing interests; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by
the lawyer's own financial, business, property or other
personal interests. 255

I propose changing section (a)(1) of Rule 1.7 as follows:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer or law firm
shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse
to another client in a matter
(i) that is substantially relatedto a matter in which the
lawyer or lawfirm represents the other client, or
(ii) either matter has provided or is likely to provide the
lawyer or law firm with access to relevant
confidential information of one client related to the
matter in which the lawyer or law firm represents
the other client, and individual lawyers with access
cannot be effectively screened under Rule 1.10.

254.

See infra Part X.

255.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).
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Possible Change to Rule 1.10(a)

Rule 1.10(a) currently states:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8 or 1.9,
except as otherwise provided therein. 256
I propose changing it to:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules
1.7, 1.8 or 1.9, unless:
(1) the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the
disqualified lawyer and does not present a significant
risk of materially limiting the representationof the client
by the remaininglawyers in thefirm; or
(2) the prohibition is based upon Rule 1.9(a) or (b) and
arises out of the disqualifiedlawyer's association with a
prior firm or prior work or exposure to confidential
information by the disqualified lawyer which, though it
may be relatedto the present representation, is not likely
to be adversely and materially affected by any
arguments or positions advanced in the present
representation,and
(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screenedfrom any
participationin the matter and is apportioned no
part of the fee therefrom; and
(ii) written notice is promptly given to any affected
former client describing the screening procedures
employed; a statement of the firm's and of the
screened lawyer's compliance with these Rules; and
an agreement by thefirm to respondpromptly to any
written inquiries or objections by the former client
about the screeningprocedures.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Rule changes such as these would not resolve all difficult conflicts
questions. They would not presage an end to all disputes, nor would they

256.

Id. r. 1.10(a).
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prevent all future battles between outside lawyers' advance waivers and
in-house counsels' guidelines. But, they would avoid arbitrary results in
many cases and should significantly reduce the number of litigated
disputes, especially those over relatively minor issues. And they could
alter the landscape in which future battles are fought in a way that better
reflects the long-term interests of both clients and attorneys as a whole.
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